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Introduction 
 
Kant’s theory of international relations has been enormously influential; and yet 
in the key text, his Perpetual Peace (1795), there appears to be a contradiction 
that threatens to undermine it entirely. Kant claims that sovereign states, like 
individuals in the state of nature, are obliged to leave that dangerous situation 
by submitting to a common external, coercive authority. Yet he also says that, 
because states have in principle achieved a situation of rightful justice 
domestically, they cannot legitimately submit to a ‘state of states’ over and above 
them. In Kant’s own words, every state, ‘for the sake of its security, can and 
ought to require the others to enter with it into a constitution similar to a civil 
constitution, in which each can be assured of its right’.i That is to say, a single 
legitimate international authority ought to decide on aspects of right – which he 
elsewhere defines as ‘the authorisation to use coercion’ ii  – bearing upon 
interstate relations. He continues: 
 
In accordance with reason there is only way that states in relation with one 
another can leave the lawless condition, which involves nothing but war; it is 
that, like individual human beings, they give up their savage (lawless) freedom, 
accommodate themselves to public coercive laws, and so form an (always 
growing) state of nations (civitas gentium) that would finally encompass all the 
nations of the earth.iii 
 
Instead, however, Kant almost immediately throws in the towel and settles for 
second best: 
 
But, in accordance with their idea of the right of nations, they do not at all want 
this, thus rejecting in hypothesi what is correct in thesi; so (if all is not to be lost) 
in place of the positive idea of a world republic only the negative surrogate of a 
league that averts war, endures, and always expands can hold back the stream of 
hostile inclinations that shies away from right, though with the constant danger 
of its breaking out.iv 
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He had put it more positively in his Theory and Practice essay of 1793, when he 
encouraged states to enter into a ‘rightful condition of federation in accordance 
with a commonly agreed upon right of nations’.v But this was still the idea of a 
supranational federation of states self-legislating whatever laws of international 
right they considered ought to obtain between them, but necessarily doing so 
without the prospect of the united will of the federation having any coercive 
authority. 
 
     It has therefore become almost obligatory for commentators immediately to 
point out that Kant’s theory is a botch. A generally sympathetic reader, for 
example, argues that ‘Kant contradicts himself, proposes standards that he later 
drops, and at several points refuses to follow his own logic towards 
uncomfortable conclusions’. vi  Another critic, not as well-disposed to the Old 
Jacobin, says that his argument is ‘transparently bad’, and that it is ‘telling 
testimony to the power of piety over intelligence that so many have for so long 
thought Perpetual Peace an impressive work’.vii  
 
     The Perpetual Peace Puzzle, then, is the puzzle of how we should account for 
the ostensible contradiction in Kant’s argument. As we shall see a little later, 
most commentators on Kant think that he did contradict himself, but they 
disagree on the question of why he did so. Some regard Kant as having made one 
argument about what is the case and another about what ought to be the case, 
which he did not discriminate as clearly as he might have done. Others argue 
that Kant got confused because the concepts with which he was working simply 
were not up to the task of helping him to formulate a coherent theory. By 
contrast, I think that Kant’s argument in Perpetual Peace is consistent, both 
with itself and with the arguments about moral agency that he developed 
elsewhere. The key to making sense of it, though, is his description of the state 
as a moral person. It is not my intention in this essay to make an argument 
about what Kant should have said.viii Rather, I think that the resources for 
understanding Kant’s argument have to be excavated from his wider 
philosophical project. 
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     The first part of the article examines what Kant meant when he wrote about 
moral personhood, in a general sense, and contextualises this in terms of some of 
the core concepts in the Kantian hinterland, namely will, reason and the moral 
law, which are essential for understanding the work that moral personhood did 
in his writings. In the second and third sections my focus turns to Kant’s theory 
of international relations. The moral personality of the state has moved 
arguments in opposing directions in the secondary literature that has dealt with 
the relevance of that characterization of the state for Kant’s international theory, 
so I focus on these contrary movements in some detail. On one recent reading – 
that of Katrin Flikschuh, dealt with in the second section – the juridical 
compulsion of states to join a state of nations or world republic is ruled out 
because this would compromise their moral personality.ix On another – that of B. 
Sharon Byrd, examined in the third section – when Kant called the state a moral 
person he intended to indicate that it possessed certain duties to itself and to 
others, for the sake of which it could be coerced to leave the international state of 
nature.x It is noticeable that Flikschuh and Byrd both fail to come to grips with 
the Perpetual Peace Puzzle, in different ways. Flikschuh stops before the 
Perpetual Peace Puzzle arises as a problem, by arguing that in fact Kant’s 
premises cannot strictly allow him to endorse any kind of authority above that of 
the state, so that both the State of Nations and the Negative Surrogate appear in 
the same light as mere wishful thinking. Byrd appears to deny that there is a 
Perpetual Peace Puzzle altogether, by arguing that Kant’s argument from the 
moral personality of states means that, whatever he may myopically have 
written in one place, states really must, on the basis of his premises, sanction the 
State of Nations. Clearly, both interpreters cannot be right, and nor can the 
textual problem which gives rise to the Perpetual Peace Puzzle be ignored by 
stopping short of addressing it (Flikschuh) or by resolving it by means of a fiction 
that Kant wrote something other than what he did in fact write (Byrd). 
Nonetheless, by pointing to the importance of the vocabulary according to which 
Kant limned the state, both scholars suggest something extremely important. I 
argue that Kant’s understanding of the state as a moral person permits him 
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coherently to incorporate the two seemingly contradictory propositions quoted 
above in a single argument. We can solve the Perpetual Peace Puzzle and we do 
not need to ignore it. 
 
 
I 
 
The best place from which to start to make headway on solving the Perpetual 
Peace Puzzle is Kant’s theory of the state. As we shall see, this theory itself is 
only made intelligible by careful scrutiny of the legal and ethical philosophies in 
which it is embedded. Kant described the state as a moral person, and he did so 
when dealing with the subject of interstate relations or the right of nations. In 
Perpetual Peace, he wrote that the state, like ‘a trunk, … has its own roots; and 
to annex it to another state as a graft is to do away with its existence as a moral 
person and to make a moral person into a thing’. xi  In Part I of the The 
Metaphysics of Morals (1797) on the Doctrine of Right, Kant again claimed that 
‘a state, as a moral person, is considered as living in relation to another state in 
a condition of natural freedom’.xii For all the interest in Kant’s theories of politics 
and international relations, the locution according to which he characterised the 
state has received very little attention.xiii And yet it is crucial, I will argue, to his 
characterization of the proper international politics that should subsist between 
states, and thus to unravelling the Perpetual Peace Puzzle. 
 
     Kant may well have taken the nomenclature from the textbook on natural law 
published by the pioneering statistician Gottfried Achenwall. xiv  At any rate, 
Kant’s marginal notes on his copy of Achenwall’s Ius naturale (1763), where the 
latter described the state as persona moralis, show Kant taking note of the 
terminology.xv But Achenwall was only the latest in a line of theorists who had, 
since the natural jurist Samuel Pufendorf (1632-94) in his The Law of Nature 
and Nations (1672), called the state a moral person. In the eighteenth century, 
the most significant writers before Kant to maintain that states were moral 
persons were the polymath Christian Wolff (1679-1754) and the diplomat Emer 
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de Vattel (1714-67). Pufendorf had contrasted moral persons to physical ones, 
where moral persons were roles or institutions – such as ‘citizen’ or ‘hospital’ – 
that were intersubjectively constituted and recognisable, to which were attached 
sundry rights and responsibilities, and which moreover were patterned on 
physical persons so that they could also be said, like individual physical human 
beings, to have reason and will.xvi The state itself, said Pufendorf, was just such 
a moral person.xvii When Wolff described the state as a moral person he exploited 
the physical-moral distinction in order to argue, against Hobbes in chapter XXX 
of Leviathan, that the law of nations could not be ‘the same thing’ as the law of 
nature applied to sovereigns.xviii This was because moral persons were different 
from physical persons, and therefore the law of nations would have to be worked 
out with due attention to this fact.xix Vattel maintained that, just as physical 
persons have a duty to do what they can to perfect themselves, so do the moral 
persons that are states.xx 
 
     As these thinkers did, Kant began by writing about moral personhood in 
general before he came to address the moral personhood of the state in 
particular. However, Kant contrasted moral personality not to physical 
personality but to what he called ‘natural’ personality or personhood.  A natural 
person, he wrote in The Metaphysics of Morals, is someone to whom we may 
impute action based at least in some part on ‘an inner determining ground’ that 
‘lies within the subject’s reason’.xxi In other words, if we may impute actions to 
an entity because we attribute to that entity some power of free will, then that 
entity is a natural person. A moral person, by contrast, is someone or something 
to which we impute not only actions but also ‘deeds’, or those actions by which 
we judge the actor capable of the power to choose between right and wrong. In 
Kant’s view, ‘imputation in the moral sense is the judgment by which someone is 
regarded as the author (libera causa) [free cause] of an action’ understood as a 
‘deed insofar as it comes under obligatory [moral] laws’, whereas natural 
personhood is about the imputation of actions which are morally indifferent.xxii 
Moral personality, for Kant, implies ‘nothing other than the freedom of a rational 
being under moral laws’, and the actions of a moral person are such that ‘the 
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agent is regarded as the author of its effect, and this, together with the action 
itself, can be imputed to him, if one is previously acquainted with the law by 
virtue of which an obligation rests on these’.xxiii 
 
     Kant says, then, that ‘natural’ persons are those beings to which we can 
attribute ownership of their actions on the basis of some exercise on their part of 
reason and will, while moral personhood involves in addition that we recognise 
in such a being the capacity freely to perform deeds whose obligation falls under 
the law of right and wrong. In order, therefore, to grasp what Kant means when 
he calls the state a moral person, we must understand what he means by the 
terms will, reason, and moral law. 
 
     Let us begin with will and reason. For Kant, will is not a faculty separate 
from intellect or reason but what he calls in the Groundwork ‘a kind of causality 
of living beings’ that they possess to the extent that they are in command of 
reason. Will, for him, is not so much a power to intervene in a chain of causes but 
rather ‘a causality in accordance with immutable laws, but of a special kind’. 
Will does not redirect a physical causal process but acts to bring the rational 
agent under the direction of causal laws of a different type. For the will is a 
causality, and since ‘the concept of a causality entails that of laws … it follows 
that freedom is by no means lawless’. xxiv  The best starting point for 
understanding what Kant means here when he describes the will as a cause 
operating in accordance with law while still potentially being free is his essay of 
1786, ‘What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?’ As the title indicates, 
in this text Kant considers the activity of thinking, and one of the questions that 
he addresses in it is, when is it appropriate to designate thinking as being free? 
His answer: ‘Freedom in thinking signifies the subjection of reason to no laws 
except those which it gives itself; and its opposite is the maxim of a lawless use of 
reason’.xxv When a person thinks, Kant argued, she may do so in accordance with 
laws of nature and therefore not freely: when a person’s thoughts are passional, 
for instance, her thinking is in line with natural causality, because desires and 
emotions can be explained in terms of physical causes. But she may also think by 
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means of what Kant called the lawless use of reason: by means of the human 
power that we call will, the free agent may think without such thought processes 
being determined by natural causes. However, Kant asserted that such lawless 
thinking would in fact be contingent on specific and variable circumstances, 
including those that are intimately a part of the agent, such as her passions. 
Thus this person would be led back to being determined by alien determinations 
as she came under the sway of other people and institutions that played on the 
ungoverned force of her passions. ‘The natural consequence’ of all this, he wrote: 
 
is that if reason will not subject itself to laws it gives itself, it has to bow under 
the yoke of laws given by another; for without any law, nothing – not even 
nonsense – can play its game for long. Thus the unavoidable consequence of 
declared lawlessness in thinking (of a liberation from the limitations of reason) is 
that the freedom to think will ultimately be forfeited.xxvi 
 
     Human beings are always in their thinking determined by some law, and the 
question, Kant says, is which. There are only two alternatives: we may be 
governed by laws of nature, or we may be governed by laws that the thinking 
power of reason gives to itself. There is no inconsistency, Kant thinks, between 
the latter form of governance and freedom. A person who thinks on the basis of a 
law that her reason has given to itself is free, in Kant’s terms. If reason, he says, 
is going to be used so that the person using it be free then it cannot hinge on 
what is contingent and variable. Reason must itself adopt a strategy of reasoning 
only on the basis of maxims on which others – whose characters and 
circumstances differ – could also agree to reason.xxvii To reason, therefore, ‘means 
no more than to ask oneself, whenever one is supposed to assume something, 
whether one could find it feasible to make the ground or the rule on which one 
assumes into a universal principle for the use of reason’, for oneself and for all 
other persons.xxviii Only such a principle – which Kant calls the principle of 
autonomy – can ensure that thinking is neither contingent on a person’s 
particular circumstances or even the particular proclivities of their character. 
And thinking on the basis of a universal rule is the same in Kant’s terms as 
thinking in line with law. Thinking freely means that we must impose 
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lawlikeness on our thinking, so that we reason on the basis of universalisable 
maxims. 
 
     In that essay, the public character of the principles of reason is emphasised, 
but the kind of freedom addressed is the freedom of thought. But Kant’s principle 
of autonomy – ‘to choose only in such a way that the maxims of your choice are 
also included as universal law in the same volition’ – became the principle not 
only for thinking but also for acting, and specifically for acting morally. In The 
Metaphysics of Morals, Kant indeed calls all the universal laws of reason that 
apply to individuals in respect of their interactions ‘moral laws’. Moral laws can 
apply, he argues, in two different ways. First, when the moral laws are 
themselves ‘the determining grounds of actions’, then we call the moral laws 
‘ethical laws’.xxix Ethics relates primarily to the freedom of agents in the sense 
described above, namely their capacity to think and act in accordance with the 
principles of pure practical reason, but in particular ethical laws comprehend the 
things that human beings may do to themselves and to each other, directly or 
indirectly, that are relevant to questions of morality. It is in the realm of ethics 
that moral persons, in Kant’s sense, step into the picture, for the actions that we 
are now concerned with are actions bearing on good and evil. When Kant comes 
to probe the topic of the morality appropriate to moral persons in the 
Groundwork, his famous first formulation of the Categorical Imperative barely 
registers a change from the principle of autonomy: ‘act only in accordance with 
that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a 
universal law’, although the law here was explicitly a moral one. xxx  The 
Categorical Imperative, then, is the fundamental principle of morality of the 
ethical order governed by the principle of autonomy as the relevant law of 
internal freedom. The fact that it is an imperative is important. It is a command 
addressing the problem of moral law for individuals who are finitely autonomous 
and rational, and who might oppose the principle of their own legislative activity 
because of their various sensuous, all-too-human, inclinations.xxxi But it is not an 
alien command; it lays upon people a duty which reason and therefore autonomy 
dictates, in order to respect the autonomy of all. It is in fact Kant’s claim that a 
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‘finite rational being, whose will is inevitably affected by, though not inevitably 
determined by, sensuous impulses, experiences objectively valid principles as 
imperatives or commands of reason’.xxxii The human being ‘brings it about that 
he becomes either good or evil, according as he either incorporates or does not 
incorporate into his maxims the incentives contained in that predisposition’ to 
the good which is the mark of his humanity.xxxiii The experience of the command 
makes a moral duty out of a moral principle.xxxiv 
 
     Reason is concerned with principles, according to Kant. The first formulation 
of the Categorical Imperative, given by reason, is a principle of morality 
governed by a principle of autonomy. Moral persons, however, are not only 
reasonable but also rational. By this, Kant means that when moral persons act, 
they act not only on principle but also for ends. Reason will thus have to discover 
a formulation of the Categorical Imperative appropriate to individuals who act 
also for ends. As with the first formulation, this must be universalisable in order 
to count as a moral law. Kant’s second formulation of the Categorical Imperative 
thus states that when human beings act they ought always to act so as to treat 
all of humanity as an end and not as a mere means to an individual’s own end: 
‘So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or the person of any 
other, always as the same time as an end, never merely as a means’.xxxv 
      
     The other part of Kant’s two-sided conception of the laws of freedom deals 
with what he calls the ‘juridical’ aspects of freedom. The major difference is that 
while ethical laws are the ‘determining grounds’ of action in the ethical sphere, 
‘juridical laws’ are ‘directed merely to external actions’ or the ‘external use of 
choice’ and concern only the ‘conformity to law’ of these actions and choices.xxxvi 
When we deem one another as capable of owning actions and deeds, says Kant, 
and thus see one other as moral persons, we also judge one another as being 
capable of external freedom, or the ability to make choices corresponding to our 
desires. Kant claims that in virtue of each person’s humanity each has an ‘innate 
right’ to make such choices, and that other’s peoples choices should not interfere 
with or take away this fundamental right. xxxvii  Kant then appeals to the 
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distinction between subjective ‘rights’ (which we possess) and objective ‘right’ 
(which posits the proper order of relationships between individuals). The concept 
of right, he holds, guides the ‘form’ of the external relations between individuals 
with respect to their choices: 
 
The concept of right … has to do, first, only with the external and indeed 
practical relation of one person to another, insofar as their actions, as deeds, can 
have (direct or indirect) influence on each other. But, second, it does not signify 
the relation of one’s choice to the mere wish (hence, also to the mere need) of the 
other … but only a relation to the other’s choice. Third, in this reciprocal relation 
of choice no account at all is taken of the matter of choice, that is, of the end each 
has in mind with the object he wants.xxxviii 
 
The concept of right, then, abstracts from an agent’s intentions with respect to 
her choices and from the principles of her actions. 
 
     However, Kant was clear that the external use of choice was still subject to 
the moral laws. He thus formulated a universal principle of right that resembled 
the Categorical Imperative except that it governed the external use of choice of 
persons rather than their ethical freedom: 
 
Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a 
universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with 
everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law.xxxix 
 
Or more straightforwardly: ‘Right is therefore the sum of the conditions under 
which the choice of one can be united with the choice of another in accordance 
with a universal law of freedom’.xl The ‘maxim of the freedom of choice’ here is 
adamantly not synonymous with the maxim or principle respecting the 
autonomy of reason in the Categorical Imperative. Rather, the universal 
principle of right demands that an agent’s execution of their maxims do not 
trespass on the conditions of external choice of another person. 
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     Kant then introduces an interesting analogy to the physical laws of nature. 
The ‘freedom of everyone under the principle of universal freedom’ can be 
understood, he writes, ‘by analogy with presenting the possibility of bodies 
moving freely under the law of the equality of action and reaction’. Rights-
relations pertain to embodied persons coexisting on the enclosed surface of the 
earth, and the concept of right comprehends a spatially bounded system. The law 
of the equality of action and reaction in the physical realm, Kant argued, might 
also be called a ‘law of reciprocal coercion’, and so the same might be said of the 
form of right.xli Reciprocal coercion, in the moral realm, means that the universal 
principle of right can be enforced coercively but legitimately. When people co-
exist together in a spatially circumscribed world, Kant argues, each person’s 
exercise of their capacity of external freedom inevitably affects everybody else’s 
exercise of that capacity. After all, having external freedom must mean having 
the means with which to set and pursue our ends, and these will involve at least 
in part external objects of our choice that we ‘have the physical power to use’, 
objects over which others might also claim rights.xlii The universal principle of 
right expresses a criterion for the compossible exercise of the external use of 
choice of each individual. But before individuals have left the state of nature 
nobody can enforce this principle; given the ‘innate equality of each’, each person 
lacks any authority by which to prescribe coercive law for everybody else. This is 
what the Kant literature calls ‘the assurance problem’. A ‘unilateral will’, he 
proclaims, ‘cannot serve as a coercive law for everyone’, because a private will 
would be contingent on one person’s judgement alone, and would not put that 
private will under the law in the same way as all others. Only ‘a will putting 
everyone under obligation, hence only a collective general (common) and 
powerful will’ is a legitimate agent for imposing a universal coercive law that can 
uphold the universal principle of right.xliii This is why the state is necessary: in 
entering into a civil condition, coexisting and legitimate rights claims against 
one another can be justifiably managed by a legitimate authority whose public 
will can pronounce valid coercive law. 
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     The laws of freedom or morals are thus to be policed in different ways, 
according to Kant. Ethical freedom is to be self-enforced by autonomous reason 
in line with the stipulations of the Categorical Imperative. External freedom is to 
be protected by a public authority in line with the universal principle of right. 
The final incentive for the proper exercise of ethical aspects of freedom, for real 
persons with their various sensibilities, is the idea of duty, while the final 
incentive for the proper exercise of juridical aspects of freedom appeals to baser 
motives: 
 
But that lawgiving which does not include the incentive of duty in the law and so 
admits an incentive other than the idea of duty is juridical. It is clear that in the 
latter case this incentive which is something other than the idea of duty must be 
drawn from pathological determining grounds of choice, inclinations and 
aversions, and among these, from aversions; for it is lawgiving, which constrains, 
not an allurement, which invites.xliv 
 
 
II 
 
We are now in a position to address Kant’s discussion of the moral personality of 
the state, for which the above account of the moral law has prepared us. Kant 
explicated his theory of the state as one aspect of his analysis of the concept of 
right, and more specifically of public right, nicely summarised by Mary Gregor as 
‘the sum of laws that need to be publicised in order to produce a rightful 
condition, one in which individuals, nations and states can enjoy their rights’.xlv 
States come into being when individuals leave the state of nature in order that 
their external freedom be protected by an authority that upholds the universal 
principle of right. But, of course, this universal principle is not thereby upheld 
universally. This is because, according to Kant in Perpetual Peace, states 
themselves ‘can be appraised as individuals, who in their natural condition (that 
is, in their independence from external laws) already wrong one another by being 
near one another’.xlvi States together inhabit the enclosed spherical space of the 
earth. Analogously to the physical law of equality of action and reaction, when 
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one state makes use of its legitimate external freedom, it impacts on all the 
others; and the ‘community of nations of the earth has now gone so far that a 
violation of right on one place of the earth is felt in all’.xlvii Kant goes further still 
in The Metaphysics of Morals, in which he maintains that if rights claims 
between states cannot properly be adjudicated and enforced, then the capacity of 
states to sustain the universal principle of right at the domestic level is also 
curtailed, for ‘if the principle of outer freedom limited by law is lacking in any’ 
possible form of rightful condition, then the ‘framework’ of the others ‘is 
unavoidably undermined and must finally collapse’.xlviii 
 
     So what did Kant advocate in order that states could extract themselves from 
this lawless and dangerous condition? It is here that we come to the apparent 
discrepancy, which I noted in the Introduction, between the universal principle 
of right – which dictates that all states ought to enter into a world republic – and 
Kant’s abrupt declaration that this will not happen and that the best that can be 
hoped for is the ‘negative surrogate’ of a voluntary league of nations. Different 
commentators have tried to account for the Perpetual Peace Puzzle in different 
ways. Some have pointed to the peculiarity of Perpetual Peace, with its peace-
treaty structure and satirical and ‘ironical tone’, and have contended that ‘Kant 
himself did not take [it] too seriously’, and that contradiction is to be expected 
among such ‘reveries’.xlix For others it is still to be considered as a serious work, 
but they have supposed that there is a ‘tension between heart and head’ on 
display, and that the capitulation is evidence of the head winning out.l ‘Kant the 
philosopher of right … in the tortured course Perpetual Peace lost the battle with 
Kant the practical politician’.li Some other expositions focus on the apparently 
pragmatic concerns about a world state adumbrated by Kant, such as his 
warning that ‘as the range of government expands laws progressively lose their 
vigour, and a soulless despotism, after it has destroyed the seeds of good, finally 
deteriorates into anarchy’. lii But others have argued persuasively that Kant’s 
objection in this respect was only to universal monarchy.liii Fewer scholars have 
focused on conceptual issues. Of those who have, most have begun by arguing 
that Kant did not mean to draw an analogy between individuals in the pre-civil 
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condition and states in the international system. Chiara Bottici, for example, 
argues that the analogy is merely ‘rhetorical’.liv She quotes Kant: ‘the difference 
between the state of nature of individual human beings and of families (in 
relation to one another) and that of nations is that in the right of nations we 
have to take into consideration not only the relation of one state towards another 
as a whole, but also the relation of individual persons of one state towards the 
individuals of another, as well as towards another state as a whole’.lv She argues 
on this basis that Kant just did not consider that states really were under a 
pressing requirement to enter into contractual relations with one another, 
because the states of nature that individual persons and state persons found 
themselves in were so disanalogous. This argument, however, seems overdrawn. 
Not only does Bottici’s quotation omit the modifier ‘only’ before ‘difference’ in the 
first sentence quoted above, but Kant himself, while acknowledging that the 
analogy between individuals and states only goes so far, cautions that ‘this 
difference … makes it necessary to consider only such features as can readily be 
inferred from the concept of a state of nature’.lvi In other words, the analogy picks 
up on features of individuals and states that they do genuinely have in common; 
we must guard against its over-extension, but it is surely more than a rhetorical 
device. 
 
     Similarly, Arthur Ripstein and Kjartan Koch Mikalsen independently argue 
that the analogy does not hold because, unlike individuals in the state of nature, 
states do not have the external objects of choice that gave rise to the assurance 
problem in the state of nature and for which the state was the solution. This is 
because ‘territory is just the spatial manifestation of the state’ rather than its 
property, which it possesses necessarily and for which it needs no omnilateral 
authorisation in the same way that persons in the state of nature needed 
authorisation of their own acquired property.lvii Territory ‘counts as embodiment 
and not property’, so any analogy between individuals and states is partial.lviii 
(Mikalsen also considers that Kant’s argument, that in the international state of 
nature states ‘wrong one another by being near one another’, points to the fact of 
territorial contiguity and does not bear on the problem of property.) But the 
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trouble with this argument is that the contrast is not so clear: a state’s borders 
are not natural in the way that a person’s body is. As Helga Varden points out, 
there ‘can be no rightful borders determined by individual states in the 
[international] state of nature for reasons similar to those explaining why there 
cannot be rightful private property boundaries in the state of nature’.lix We know 
that there is a problem of indeterminacy with regard to state borders that does 
not exist when it comes to individual persons and their bodies. Ironically, then, 
this difference between states and individuals gives us reason to take seriously 
Kant’s commitment to an analogy between persons and states. 
 
     Perhaps the most compelling explanation of Kant’s reticence to follow through 
on the premises of his analogical argument from individuals in the state of 
nature to states in the international system has been put forward recently by 
Katrin Flikschuh. I want to focus on her account in some detail, because its 
limitations reveal why Kant’s description of the state as a moral person is so 
important for his international theory and for making sense of the Perpetual 
Peace Puzzle. lx  Flikschuh recognises that for Kant states have ‘moral 
personality’, and that this ‘warrants the … analogy between individuals and 
states’. But, she argues, there is an important limitation of this analogy, which is 
that ‘individuals’ wills are juridically non-sovereign, whereas states’ wills are 
juridically sovereign’. lxi  The state itself is the very principle of the morally 
justified coercion of external freedom in accordance with the universal principle 
of right. It is this that justifies its sovereignty. Now, in Kant’s words, every state 
by definition ‘involves the relation of a superior (legislating) to an inferior 
(obeying…)’. lxii  But, says, Flikschuh, under the idea of an international civil 
condition for states akin to the civil condition between individuals, ‘the concept of 
state is made to occupy the position of superior and inferior, ruler and ruled, 
simultaneously’, and this is a contradiction. lxiii  She considers that Kant had 
moral reasons for hedging his analogy between individuals and states. ‘Non-
sovereign individuals can be compelled into the civil condition as the only 
condition under which their [rights] claims become enforceable. Their being so 
compelled in no way affects their status as (non-sovereign) moral persons’. But it 
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is morally impermissible to compel states themselves to enter into a state of 
states, because, she holds, ‘in contrast to non-sovereign individual persons, their 
possession of sovereign authority is the very mark of their distinctive moral 
personality as states’, and thus ‘the juridical compulsion of states would 
compromise their moral personality’.lxiv The force of Kant’s argument, then, is 
conceptual. Too many commentators have, in her view, latched onto Kant’s 
assertion, quoted above, that states simply do not want to enter into a civil 
condition with one another and thus have attributed to him a declaratory 
conception of sovereignty, according to which the state’s ‘capacity to act on its 
own terms serves as warrant for its refusal to recognise any higher juridical or 
indeed moral authority’.lxv Rather, she writes, Kant’s conception of sovereignty is 
juridical, as he himself made clear: 
 
What holds in accordance with natural right for human beings in a lawless 
condition, [that] ‘they ought to leave this condition’, cannot hold for states in 
accordance with the right of nations (since, as states, they already have a rightful 
constitution internally and have hence outgrown the constraint of others to bring 
them under a more extended law-governed constitution in accordance with their 
concepts of right).lxvi 
 
Or as Flikschuh puts it, given ‘their moral status, states ought to submit under a 
supra-state public authority’, but given ‘the grounds of their moral status they 
cannot do so, but must treat themselves and one another as juridically sovereign 
agents’.lxvii 
 
     The moral personality of the state, on this reading, is nothing but a ‘publically 
constituted juridical will’ that is itself the ‘condition of legitimately enforceable 
[external] freedom claims between private persons’. lxviii  States are therefore 
subject only to the morality of right: specifically, that share of public right which 
Kant calls international right. ‘The idea of individual autonomy’, Flikschuh 
argues, ‘plays no role in Kant’s philosophy of Right’.lxix States are not subject, 
then, to ethical laws of freedom. And so Kant must be left to flail: he wants states 
to enter into a civil condition with each other, but his own argument indicates 
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that this is morally impermissible from the standpoint of the concept of right. He 
gestures at such a proposal, but it is little more than meaningless handwringing. 
Hence the confused recommendation of a non-coercive league where each state 
self-enforces principles of international right, even though self-enforcement is 
irrelevant to the morality of right. Kant bequeaths to the liberal international 
order founded by those he inspired, according to Flikschuh, an international 
society of un-coercible agents, which on his own terms is a situation of injustice. 
In the final analysis, Kant’s is a ‘failed argument from an analogy between 
individuals and states’, and we are all heirs to his failure.lxx 
 
     Flikschuh’s interesting critical exegesis of Kant, however, goes wrong at one 
point. The major problem with such an account of Kant’s notion of the moral 
person of the state is that it equates the moral personality of the state to legal 
personality in its contemporary sense. To be sure, the history of the concept of 
moral personhood has often seen it inscribed in a legal context. For example, 
corporations had long been described as personae fictae or fictional persons when 
Kant wrote, and medieval French canon lawyers translated persona ficta as 
personne morale or ‘moral person’ in their discussions of how it was that 
corporations such as hospitals and monasteries could acquire property or receive 
gifts. lxxi  The point was to mark that corporations were independent legal 
subjects, as real in law as its individual human subjects, although they were 
subjects by legal fiction, real subjects only within the framework of the law. 
‘Moral person’ was a juridical notion; and when Flikschuh records Kant as 
describing the state as a moral person she says that this means that the state 
possesses a ‘juridical will’ and is therefore subject only to public right. lxxii 
However, Kant’s use of the concept of moral personality is discontinuous with 
this legal heritage, just as Pufendorf had used the notion of moral personality to 
denote an institutional identity and centre of willing and action in a social, 
political and economic world served by law but by no means existing for the sake 
of law. When he takes up the term, Kant also does something quite different 
with it. We saw above that Kant intends moral personhood to convey that a 
‘natural’ person – one to whom we could attribute ownership of any actions at all 
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– also owns those of their actions that fall under moral laws, including ethical 
laws as much as juridical ones. Might it not be the case, therefore, that by calling 
the state a moral person, Kant explicitly inscribes it within the ambit of the 
ethical as much as the juridical? States might be as much a part of the kingdom 
of ends as they are part of the system of right. They might be duty-bound to 
adhere to the maxims of the moral law. 
 
 
III 
 
I think that it indeed is the case that the wider frame of reference for Kant’s use 
of the term ‘moral person’ is thoroughly germane to his philosophy of 
international relations. Indeed, the portrayal of the state in terms of the more 
complete set of commitments involved with the concept of moral personhood has 
not gone entirely unnoticed by Kant scholars. B. Sharon Byrd has probed Kant’s 
label more systematically and fully than anyone else. ‘Central to the notion of a 
moral person’, she points out, ‘is that the person is self-legislating, or 
autonomous, is subject to morals laws, is endowed with freedom of choice, and 
therefore is someone who actions are capable of imputation’. lxxiii  Unlike 
Flikschuh and the other interpreters of Kant surveyed above, Byrd argues for a 
strong analogy between human beings and states in Kant’s thought, secured by 
the moral-person description. She argues that Kant uses the notion of the state 
as being a moral person precisely so as ‘to indicate that a state has perfect and 
imperfect duties to itself and to other states corresponding to [his] portrayal of 
these duties for the individual’.lxxiv 
 
     Where Flikschuh asks us to read Kant’s international theory in light of his 
Doctrine of Right, Byrd asks us to read it in light of the second part of The 
Metaphysics of Morals, his Doctrine of Virtue. It is here that Kant elaborates a 
distinction between perfect and imperfect duties.lxxv This is a complex division 
that Kant expounds in different ways. First, perfect duties prescribe an action 
that we are to take (or omit), while imperfect duties prescribe ‘only the maxim of 
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the action … not the action itself’. lxxvi  That is to say, ‘perfect duties impose 
requirements on actions; imperfect duties on ends’. lxxvii  Second, perfect and 
imperfect duties are obligatory in different ways. The only kind of latitude 
permitted in respect of perfect duties is to decide whether a given moral principle 
is relevant at all, and if the policy of conduct prescribed by the duty is disjunctive 
in form – if it can be satisfied by doing A or B or C – then to decide on how best 
to discharge the duty. Perfect duties specify act-types (‘Repay Jane the £10 you 
owe her’), and some act-token (paying her with ten one-pound coins, or two five-
pound notes, or a cheque) of the act-type specified by the duty must always be 
observed.lxxviii Because perfect duties prescribe policies of conduct rather than the 
form of conduct, then, they admit of little ‘playroom for free choice’. lxxix  By 
contrast, imperfect duties, while obligatory, admit of much greater latitude. The 
Metaphysics of Morals is ambiguous about this latitude. The designation of a 
duty as imperfect, says Kant, ‘is not to be taken as permission to make 
exceptions to the maxim of actions but only as permission to limit one maxim of 
duty by another (e.g. love of one’s neighbour in general by love of one’s 
parents)’.lxxx Thus, Marcia W. Baron argues that the latitude of imperfect duties 
permits an individual to forego doing an action if she is already performing 
another act that falls under the principle of imperfect or perfect duty; whereas 
Thomas E. Hill argues that the latitude extends to allowing people to forego 
performing an action as long as they will do so at another point in time: people 
only have a pro tanto reason to discharge imperfect duties on some occasions, 
because otherwise they would be too demanding.lxxxi Thirdly, Kant explains that 
perfect duties in principle admit of being perfectly attained, whereas imperfect 
duties enjoin ends which are only approachable and which we will never 
absolutely be able to attain.lxxxii 
 
     The kind of point that Byrd that wants to make by picking up on Kant’s 
description of the state as a moral person is well illustrated in the following 
quotation: 
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[T]he state has a perfect duty to itself not to permit revolution and its own 
dissolution, just as the individual has the perfect duty to maintain himself and 
not commit suicide. The state has the imperfect duty to itself to reform the 
constitution, just as the individual has the imperfect duty to himself to develop 
his talents. The state has perfect duties to other states corresponding to the three 
Ulpian formulae honeste vive [live honourably], neminem laede [injure no one], 
and suum cuique tribue [give to each their due] similar to duties of law as 
applicable to individuals. Finally, the state has the imperfect duty to other states 
to render aid in times of sudden need, just as the individual has the imperfect 
duty to be charitable to others.lxxxiii 
 
Byrd, then, considers that the analogy Kant draws between individuals and 
states by means of the category of moral person is seriously intended and 
anchors the state in the ethical as much as the legal realm. The individual moral 
person has a duty to make efforts to improve herself, which efforts will 
inescapably be interminable, meaning that the duty can only be satisfied 
‘imperfectly’. Similarly, the moral person of the state has a duty to perfect its 
constitution, a duty that is approachable but not attainable, and therefore 
imperfect. By contrast, killing oneself destroys the subject of morality and so 
there is a perfect duty not to do it, just as the state has a perfect duty to defend 
its constitution, however ‘afflicted with great defects and gross faults’ it may be, 
against a people who should ‘wish to put force in place of the supreme legislation 
that prescribes all rights, which would result in a supreme will that destroys 
itself’.lxxxiv Just as an individual human being has a perfect duty always to seek 
to be worthy of honour – which pulls her away from self-love, forces her to want 
to set an example of moral conduct, and which if not respected would allow 
others to hold her in contempt and thus do violence to the dignity of humanity – 
so the state has a perfect duty always to seek to be worthy of the honour of 
others.lxxxv And so on. 
 
     However, Byrd’s own elucidation of the perfect/imperfect duties distinction 
draws out the contrast in a manner which is unwarranted by anything in Kant’s 
texts, but with important implications for her own argument in respect of the 
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Perpetual Peace Puzzle. Imperfect duties, she says, are ‘ethical duties’, whereas 
perfect duties are ‘legal duties’.lxxxvi While ethical duties, Byrd holds, correspond 
to the determining grounds of choice and cannot be coerced, legal duties 
correspond to the law of external freedom and to the sphere of right, and are 
thus coercible. Here, however, Byrd collapses two different distinctions that 
Kant did indeed make into one. He certainly did distinguish between juridical 
duties (or duties of right) and ethical duties (duties of virtue), where juridical 
duties are those to which people can be held by coercion.lxxxvii But he did not 
equate all perfect and juridical duties, nor did he identify all imperfect duties 
with ethical duties. For instance, among perfect duties to oneself Kant included 
prohibitions on lust, drunkenness and gluttony (as misuses of one’s capacity for 
freedom), and on lying, avarice and servility (for these undermined one’s freedom 
of choice directly). lxxxviii . Among perfect duties to others he enumerated 
proscriptions of arrogance and ridicule. lxxxix None of these did he consider as 
giving rise to legally enforceable rights claims on the part of those injured. The 
distinction between perfect and imperfect duties comes out most clearly when 
these duties are indeed phrased as prohibitions. It is at base a distinction 
between prohibitions of activities that either destroy or compromise free choice 
(perfect duties) or activities that would erode the capacity to cultivate or 
facilitate end-setting and the pursuit of such ends (imperfect duties). As Paul 
Guyer argues, all follow in one way or other from the Categorical Imperative to 
treat human beings as ends rather than means.xc Ethical duties are all either 
perfect or imperfect and none of them is necessarily coercible by dint of being so 
grouped, which is why Kant explains them all in the Doctrine of Virtue, which is 
about ethics, rather than in the Doctrine of Right, which is about justice. 
 
     Whatever Kant may have written about what states want, Byrd says, states 
are moral persons, and just as human individuals are obliged by perfect duty to 
leave the pre-civil condition so states have a perfect – and coercible – duty to 
leave the international state of nature.xci Byrd’s reading thus begins with the 
claim that as moral persons states are ethical agents capable of acting on 
principle, but it ends by suggesting that the commitment of states to enter into a 
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world republic is a requirement of Recht. But Byrd’s interpretation is not only 
undermined by a textually unjustified folding of one distinction into another; it is 
also crippled by another fundamental lack of evidence. There simply are no 
documentary grounds for such an interpretation of Kant, who nowhere says that 
states are legally obliged to renounce their sovereignty and enter into a state of 
nations. She solves the Perpetual Peace Puzzle by extrapolating from an 
argument that Kant does not make in order to argue that he says something that 
he does not say. 
 
     All the same, Byrd is right that the imperfect duty of self-perfection that Kant 
ascribes to individuals also applies to states, and it is in this respect, I think, 
that Kant’s characterisation of states as moral persons begins to make sense of 
the Perpetual Peace Puzzle. How so? As a moral person, the state is more than a 
natural person, and the ‘more’ indicates that we take it to have not only a broad 
will that may choose between options about how to act, but also a specific power 
of the will to recognise and choose between options which fall under the moral 
law of right and wrong. This is the whole moral law, not solely the juridical 
aspect of the law governing external actions but also the ethical aspect governing 
the proper use of autonomy. As a ‘moral person’, therefore, according to Kant the 
state must have a capacity to be moved to act by the idea of duty. Duty in the 
abstract decomposes into definite perfect and imperfect duties, and the moral 
person of the state has perfect and imperfect duties like any other. According to 
Kant, the fundamental imperfect duty to oneself is the cultivation of one’s own 
excellence in order to facilitate the pursuit of the ends that one has set oneself. 
Such efforts must necessarily be endless as self-perfection can never be realised, 
and therefore the duty to pursue it must be imperfect. Likewise, the moral 
person of the state has an imperfect duty to pursue its own self-perfection. And 
states will undeniably stand a greater chance of perfecting themselves if war is 
eradicated. Even though a state of states is, from a juridical perspective of the 
kind clarified by Flikschuh, a contradiction, 
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the political principles directed towards perpetual peace, of entering into such 
alliances of states, which serve for continual approximation to it, are not 
unachievable. Instead, since continual approximation to it is a task based on duty 
… this can certainly be achieved.xcii 
 
Kant therefore needs the notion of the state as a moral person in order that the 
state can be said to have a capacity for autonomy and thus to be an actor in the 
ethical as well as the juridical domain. Thus situated, the state is figured as an 
individual with the capacity to respond to and self-enforce the demands of 
morality. The moral person of the state is therefore obliged to enter into a non-
sovereign association of states and to try to manage its relations with the others 
according to certain principles in the name of which the state responds to the 
ethical requirements for self-perfection and benevolence to others. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this article, I have tried to make sense of the Perpetual Peace Puzzle, namely 
Kant’s curiously incongruous argument that states, according to the universal 
principle of right, should ‘give up their savage (lawless) freedom [and] 
accommodate themselves to public coercive laws’, but that, ‘in accordance with 
their idea of the right of nations’ that follows from this same principle, they 
cannot be expected to do this, and thus the best that can be hoped for is ‘the 
negative surrogate’ of a voluntary league in which member states agree to try to 
manage their relationships in order to forestall conflict. Why did Kant 
straightaway give up on the positive implications of his universal principle of 
right? What is it about the right of nations that means that the principle does 
not apply to states? 
 
     I have argued that we can get a handle on the Perpetual Peace Puzzle by 
attending to Kant’s argument that the state is one species of the genus ‘moral 
person’. Moral persons, according to Kant, are agents to whom we can attribute 
the power to discriminate and choose between actions that fall under the moral 
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law. As we have seen, the moral law is for Kant two-pronged. In its juridical 
aspect, the moral law is directed to agents who can make choices in accordance 
with their desires and who must coexist in a physical space with other such 
agents. In its ethical aspect, the moral law is directed to agents who can make 
choices in accordance with the idea of duty. In terms of the juridical aspect of the 
moral law, states are both analogous and disanalogous to individual human 
beings. They are analogous because both states and individuals must take 
account of other such beings when they make choices based on their desires. 
They are disanalogous, however, because the state itself comes into being to 
bring about a rightful condition amongst individuals, that is, a condition in 
which each individual’s freedom of choice can optimally be accommodated to that 
of every other by putting all such individuals under a general will that upholds 
the universal principle of right coercively but legitimately. The disanalogy is 
very important, then, because, as Flikschuh demonstrates, it helps us to 
understand why Kant would argue that, on the one hand, states should enter 
into a world republic, but why, on the other, they must refuse to do this. In other 
words, the respects in which individual human beings and states are both 
analogous and disanalogous from the perspective of right explains in part the 
Perpetual Peace Puzzle. 
 
      But it is only a partial explanation, for it cannot explain why Kant continues 
to insist that states ought to commit to a non-coercive league of states instead. 
For if all it means for a state to be a moral person is that it possesses a 
‘publically constituted juridical will’ that is itself the ‘condition of legitimately 
enforceable freedom claims between private persons’, then it is hard to see how 
Kant can want the state to enter into any wider association that is not itself a 
stipulation of public right. xciii  The solution to this part of the puzzle is to 
persevere with Kant’s argument that states are moral persons. To be a moral 
person does not mean that the agent so described is only subject to the universal 
principle of right; a moral person is also subject to the ethical laws of freedom. 
We are entitled to impute to states, as moral persons, a capacity to regulate 
themselves according to the idea of duty. Ethical duty in the abstract finds form 
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in concrete perfect and imperfect duties. As a moral person, therefore, the state 
has perfect and imperfect duties to itself and to others, and these duties explain 
why it is that states should enter into a voluntary league of nations, because 
such a league is a necessary condition for states to work towards their own 
betterment and that of others, which is the fundamental imperfect duty. 
 
     The greatest of thinkers who managed to wrestle systematic thought from 
contradictions, Hegel, famously chided the ‘empty formalism’ of Kant’s ethics, 
and argued that Kant’s ‘criterion that there should be no contradiction’ between 
duty in the abstract and the actual duties that follow from the principle ‘is non-
productive – for where there is nothing, there can be no contradiction either’.xciv I 
have argued that Kant’s philosophy of international relations is not as 
contradictory as it might appear to be and as it has appeared to others. I am sure 
that many contemporary ‘Kantian’ analysts of global ethics – who have tended to 
concentrate on the system of right, and for whom virtue has not been a major 
concern – will not think that the Perpetual Peace Problem can be resolved by an 
appeal to duty or virtue, which is what I have argued is in effect Kant’s own 
answer to the deep conceptual problem in his system of right.xcv They may well 
be right to have serious concerns. But this is Kant’s answer nonetheless. 
Whether it is ‘productive’ can remain an open question. Now that the answer has 
been made clear I hope that it might illuminate further thinking as well as 
provide a better-lit target. 
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